

WHY, AT ALL, DO WE NEED RELIGION? Religion and Morality in Post-Communist Europe

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REVITALIZATION OF RELIGION IN POST-COMMUNISM: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

Continuing debates about the secularization process in Europe, and particularly about the impact of secularization on different aspects of individual and social life, got one another dimension after 1989. Up to then officially atheist part of Europe collapsed and religion generally got new, previously unimaginable possibilities of public acting. This process, usually marked as revitalization process, started to dominate both social life and scientific researches.

However, the story has been far from being clear. At least three parallel processes have been noticed and discussed.¹

First, the revitalization of religion is clearly confirmed, at least on two basic grounds. The first one is connected with the role of Churches in public life. The pre-Communist time was not resurrected but (particularly dominant) Churches resumed much of their power lost after 1945. They re-established their official ties with states (in the case of the Catholic Churches by international agreements with the Holy See), they re-entered public schools, returned much of their properties and got big media attention. The second aspect was visible from the data on individual connections with Churches and/or religion. Although the base line was very different among different countries, they all noticed the trend of rising religiosity in the late 80s and early 90s.

Although noticeable the revitalization trend did not occur in the same pace in different countries but, moreover, the striking thing is that differences in the level of religiosity among countries have remained so big, bigger than in Western Europe. Those who claim belonging to religious denomination range in 1999 from 97.6% in Romania and 95.7% in Poland through 70.0% and 57.7% in Bulgaria and Hungary respectively to only 33.5% and 24.8% in the Czech Republic and Estonia respectively. In the light of these data any speech about the revitalization for a large group of countries (even if it is, up to certain level, true) has become almost meaningless.

Third and apart from the limited revitalization in some countries, many researches pointed out contradictory aspects of the new social life of religion. According to the existing sociological literature these contradictory aspects can be further subdivided in different branches. The majority of approaches paid attention to adaptation problem: Churches generally want to awake their pre-communist position what is hardly possible in changed modern world. Confused expectations from the public complicates the picture: at the same time the majority rejects political involvement and even public social role of Churches (epitomized in the phrase: priests should restrict their activities to Church buildings) but expect their involvement in public issues, such as rising poverty and inequality, rights of workers, etc. These contradictory expectations can be connected with very visible ideological (left-right) social division and debates about the proper role of Churches in modern world. The position of religious minorities in post-Communist Europe emphasizes the old dilemma: how to reconcile

¹ This part of paper is based on numerous sources such as: Borowik, Babiński, 1997; Borowik, 1999; Borowik, Tomka, 2001; Tomka, Zulehner, 1999; Zrinščak, 2002; Marinović Jerolimov, Zrinščak, Borowik, 2004; Zrinščak, 2004. etc.

different social significance of certain religions with the principle of equality of all religions in a secular state. Third, expectation of quick secularization according to quick modernization of societies after 1989 and different reforms they are undertaking is already shifting the scientific focus from the revitalization to further diminishing of social relevance of religion.

Expected secularization will certainly shape future debates about consequential impacts of religion in secularized Europe. Yet, this debate is already possible in the light of the fact that many post-Communist countries are even today more secular (atheist?) in comparison to many Western European countries. It is, however, very interesting that these consequential aspects are up to now more revealed by theologians than sociologists from Eastern European countries. Starting from the normative approach they rightly noticed that "new religiosity" did not in many cases mean the rise of "true believers". New and welcomed public position of religion is jeopardized by false believers and new threats coming from an increasingly secularized society. In communism so desperately dreamed liberty could be now even seen as a gift from a devil and the question spontaneously arises: why, at all, do we need liberty?

GODS, RITUALS, AND THE MORAL ORDER: THE RECENT LESSON BY RODNEY STARK

What does it mean to be religious? What difference does it make? Rodney Stark questions a widespread belief that religion functions to sustain moral order, and particularly that it is only through participation in collective rituals that people are bound into a moral community (Stark, 2001).

Stark's work is based on four hypotheses he confirms in his analysis:

1. In many societies, religion and morality will not be linked;
2. This linkage will tend to be limited to more complex culture;
3. The effects of religiousness on individual morality are contingent on images of gods as conscious, morally-concerned beings; religiousness based on impersonal or unmoral gods will not influence moral choices;
4. Participation in religious rites and rituals will have little or no independent effect on morality.

Correlation between religion and morality (i.e. three moral statements researched inside the 1990 World Values Study) showed that moral statements are more linked to the importance of God than to the Church attendance but also that this linkage is particularly weak in post-Communist Europe. The particular situation of Eastern Europe is explained in two following hypotheses:

1. Communist efforts to weaken the link between religion and morality will show up in substantially weaker correlations in the nonorthodox nations of Eastern Europe than found in Western Europe;
2. Within Eastern Europe, the more remote orthodox conception of God will result in correlations that are weaker in orthodox nations than in nonorthodox nations. In combination with the effects of Communist repression, this will result in a lack of any significant correlations between God and morality in the orthodox nations, except in Romania.

If religion can not demonstrate its power to sustain moral order in post-Communist countries does it mean that we are facing long-standing and not easily shaken effects of Communist order? The post-Communist revitalization had no power to change significantly this effect? What, at all, religion serves in post-Communist societies?

RELIGION AND MORALITY IN POST-COMMUNISM: ARE NON-EXISTENT TIES STILL PRESENT IN THE LATE '90S?

This paper does not have only intention to repeat Stark's study nine years later (and see whether some important changes happened concerning the role of religion in societies) but also to question crucial findings that religion is not capable to sustain moral order in contemporary European societies, Western and Eastern.

Stark's analysis is based on the 1990 World Values Study data which focused eight post-Communist societies: Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, Russia, Bulgaria, Belarus and Romania. He restricted the analysis only on three moral statements that were judged as unjustified by a substantial majority in each nation: (1) buying something you knew was stolen, (2) failing to report damage you've done accidentally to a parked car, (3) taking the drug marijuana or hashish.

The European Values Study 1999/2000 on which data is based this analysis embraced 14 post-Communist countries. Therefore, it can serve as a reliable source of data in two senses: it focused a wider range of post-Communist countries a decade after 1989, a decade in which a new social position of religion could has demonstrated significant social effects.

Moral statements which were included in these two researches (WVS and EVS) are not completely the same but are very similar which allows a kind of comparison. Beside that, it is not clear why only statements that are found unjustified by a substantial majority in each nation should be taken

into consideration. Religion should and can demonstrate its affect on different moral statements, whether they are embraced by majority or not – only, in that case, we are not talking about one and unproblematic moral community, but different moral communities that interact with other social divisions of each society.

Based on the 1999/2000 EVS data from 14 Western and 13 Eastern European societies the following analysis will focus the linkage between both the Church attendance and the importance of God and six moral statements. The Church attendance is measured by the four-point scale from (1) never to (4) at least once a week. The importance of God is measured by the ten-point scale from 1 (absolutely not important) to 10 (very important). Six moral statements are also measured by the degree of justification at the ten-point scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always) and they embraced both statements which are judged as unjustified by a substantial majority and statements which substantially divide societies:

- (1) claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to;
- (2) cheating on tax if you have a chance;
- (3) taking the drug marijuana or hashish;
- (4) married men/women having an affair;
- (5) homosexuality;
- (6) abortion.

The further analysis is based on three steps. First, it will show and discuss the level of acceptance of each statement in different societies. Second, it will analyze correlation between two measures of religiosity and 6 moral statements in each society. Finally, it will further check the significance of correlation with the regression analysis.

Moral statements: religious and/or cultural norms?

The table 1 shows the level of acceptance of different moral statements in 14 Western and 13 Eastern European societies by the mean value at the scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always). Graphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the same in more details for two statements, one for which differences between Western and Eastern Europe are the smallest (claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to) and one for which differences are the greatest (homosexuality).

Table 1
Mean value of acceptance of different moral statements

	(1) Claiming state benefit...	(2) Cheating on tax...	(3) Taking the drug...	(4) Married men...	(5) Homosexuality	(6) Abortion
Western Europe ²	2.41	2.51	2.16	2.40	5.40	4.79
Eastern Europe ³	2.30	2.61	1.52	2.70	2.88	4.37
Catholic countries ⁴	2.14	2.53	1.76	2.34	3.80	3.88

Table and graphs show some very interesting aspects of acceptance. Irrespectively of some country differences acceptance of the first four statements is generally low in all countries. Eastern Europeans are something more inclined to cheat on tax or to cheat their spouses but are less inclined to justify taking the drug marijuana or hashish. Differences are also not so big concerning abortion. Although this finding seems strange it should be noted that Communist regimes in the name of liberation of women allowed very liberal anti-abortion laws (except in Romania). The greatest and clear difference is shown in the case of homosexuality which is double more accepted in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe.

² Western Europe: France, Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Northern Ireland, and Ireland.

³ Eastern Europe: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

⁴ Catholic countries are those with more than 70% of Catholics: Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Lithuania, Poland, and Croatia.

Another interesting thing is the position of the Catholic countries. They differ in first four cases from both Western and Eastern Europe, but not substantially. Again, the greatest difference comes from the last two statements, which cover moral issues which usually the Catholic Church finds as very important for its moral teaching. Well, in the case of homosexuality, the Catholic countries are above the mean for Eastern Europe, what is clearly not the case for abortion. That proves that the Catholic countries have some distinctive traits, but it proves also the fact that distinctiveness is mediated by social circumstances. In two cases there are big differences between the Western European Catholic countries and the Eastern European Catholic countries. For taking the drug marijuana or hashish the Western European Catholic countries have the mean value of 1.99, something lower from other Western European countries (2.24), but higher in comparison to whole Eastern Europe (1.52), and particularly the Eastern European Catholic countries (1.38). Very similar pattern occurs in the case of homosexuality where the Western European Catholic countries have the mean value (4.65) double higher than the Eastern European Catholic countries (2.39). Interestingly, that is not the same in the case of abortion where both Western and Eastern European Catholic countries have mean values very similar (3.94 and 3.69 respectively) what is indeed lower than in all other countries.

Religion clearly affects justification of some moral norms. That is already visible from very crude analysis which notice differences between countries. However, some moral norms are found generally unjustified in almost all nations. Irrespectively of the long history in which religion played a role, it is obvious that some moral norms are today accepted whether or not individual is religious. They became cultural norms of the Western world.

Why and how is religion important?

Religious differences between countries, noticed particularly in the case of the Catholic countries, should be visible also inside each country. Religious influence is here measured by the correlations between two measures of religiosity (Church attendance and importance of God) with all six moral statements. Results are shown in tables 2 and 3. The higher the negative value the strongest is the impact of Church attendance or importance of God on rejection of each statement.

Two things stand out. The importance of God is generally better predictor of influence to moral statements than the Church attendance. The Eastern European countries generally had lower correlations than the Western European countries. These two conclusions resemble to what Stark pointed out in his analysis.

Six moral statements that encompass a wider range of very different moral areas show that there is no unique relation between religion and morality. First two statements (claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to and cheating on tax if you have a chance), particularly the first one, have significantly lower correlations than other statements. Concerning the Church attendance correlations are not statistically significant among four Western and eight Eastern European countries and concerning the importance of God among four Western and six Eastern European countries. When correlations are statistically significant they are very weak. However, this is not the case for other moral statements, and particularly for attitudes toward homosexuality and abortion. Here, religion has a strong impact. For abortion, correlations are high and statistically significant for all countries, except in one case (correlation with the Church attendance for Bulgaria).

Relations between religion and morality show also another interesting faces. Compared to previous data of general acceptance of different moral norms it is obvious that correlations are higher where and when some moral norms are not a part of social consensus in a particular country, or where particular religion pays much attention to it (abortion for example). General level of religiosity in each country should be also taken into account. The influence of the importance of God to claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to is statistically significant in all Catholic Western European countries and in two (although with lower correlation) of three Catholic Eastern European countries, but not in many other countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden or Belgium. That could not be taken as a ground for conclusion that in these countries moral norms are not accepted by majority. However, in cases where different opinions exist, religion can have more influences, and that is the case not only in countries with higher religious monopoly: the level of influence (measured by correlations) for five moral statements (except the first one) is in the Netherlands (where, for example, acceptance of taking the drug marijuana or hashish or homosexuality is much more widespread)⁵ equal to other, usually more religious societies.

⁵ For taking the drug marijuana or hashish the mean value of acceptance is in the Netherlands 3.08, compared to 2.16 for the whole Western Europe. For homosexuality the values are 7.82 (the Netherlands) and 5.39 (Western Europe).

What to say about Eastern Europe? Correlations are generally lower than in Western Europe. There exist, of course, some important differences among post-communist countries. Correlations are very low and are not significant, especially in Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine. These are, at the same time, countries with the low level of religiosity. Although not impressively, correlations are something higher in Romania, a country with a very high level of religiosity. The Catholic countries of Eastern Europe (Lithuania, Poland, and Croatia) have something higher and more significant correlations in comparison to other countries. Clearly, important differences exist, but there is not a simple or clear pattern. The same can be said about the possible impact of Communism. The unique political system had important differences and did not result with same consequences concerning the position of religion or its possible influence. The marginal position of religion which generally did not have much possibility to enter the public domain certainly has had an impact on how today religion operates in society. Well, the marginality of religion was much higher in Russia than, for example, in Poland or Croatia. At the same time, there is an impact of post-communist circumstances, like an evident social anomie. Cheating on tax is rejected as immoral behavior, but at the same time the majority believes that their compatriots cheat on tax in a large proportion and are inclined to do the same if they found it "personally constructive".

Finally, as already noticed, the importance of God is better predictor than the Church attendance. Personal and more thoughtful relations to God can better underpin some moral statements. Does it mean that the Church attendance is irrelevant for moral community? There are at least two reasons which call for a negative response. First, the Church attendance and the importance of God are highly correlated. These two measures of religiosity are not identical, but are usually interconnected. Second, the Church attendance is relevant measure of religiosity and can indicate different roles Churches play in a particular society. If Church gatherings are not so able to underpin moral community they are, particularly in some societies, still able to underpin social community what is, in a way or another, a significant factor in overall functioning of a society.

Regression analysis just confirmed correlation analysis (tables 4, 5, and 6). The highest the negative value the strongest is the impact of both measures of religiosity. Only statistically significant results above 0.05 are shown in tables. Therefore, religion simply does not play any role concerning attitudes toward claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to. The same can be said for cheating on tax. Correlations are in this case something higher, but R square is generally very low. Religious influence is higher in the case of other moral norms, the highest for abortion. Again, the importance of God is better predictor but in many countries both indicators of religiosity act in the same direction. For Eastern Europe percentage of explained variance is generally lower than for Western Europe. There are also noticeable exemptions. There are many cases where R square is higher than 10%, what means that religion has power in explaining negative attitudes toward some immoral behaviors.

INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON FAMILY/PRIVATE LIFE AND PUBLIC DOMAIN: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION

The analysis shows that religion has a different impact on moral attitudes: no impact on some public issues and significant on moral norms in the field of sexuality. It also shows that the impact largely depends on particular social circumstances in each country and that this impact can be, for those who remain religious, equally strong in countries with very different level of religiosity.

The need for look on different social areas in order to understand the possible role of religion was recently underlined also by the work of Halman and Pettersson (1999). Two their conclusions are worth mentioning here. First is that the impact of religion is higher on private family issues than on public issues.⁶ On the other hand the level of religious involvement and the impact of religious involvement on private and public issues seem to be unrelated. Or, more clearly: "To the degree to which the social issues we have investigated (family values, and political values, respectively) are contested and disputed, they should be unrelated to religious involvement in countries where the religious involvement is comparatively high. On the other hand, in countries where the religious involvement is comparatively low, the situation must be reversed. In such a case, the religious involvement might be more easily related to a specific view on contested social issues" (1999:59).

Although they focused different areas, both analyses suggest a distinction between public and private sphere. Religion is more important in private than public issues. Social community in contemporary Western societies is obviously based on some cultural norms that are accepted by majority. That does not mean that religion has nothing with these moral claims. But if one norm is

⁶ They analyzed acceptance of «non-traditional family values» (statements such as «whether or not children need both father and mother to grow up happily» etc.) and political views (such as «incomes should be made more equal» vs. «there should be greater incentives for individual effort» etc.).

accepted by majority, whether they are religious or not, religious differences become, of course, irrelevant.

Religion still matters, at least in some private family issues, such as marriage, divorce, homosexuality, relations between parents and children etc. The impact of religion, mediated by specific social circumstances, is very visible even in highly secularized European societies. On the contrary, there are many societies where, for example, rejection of homosexuality is widely spread, and in these societies many irreligious people can share, again as a social/cultural norm, the same attitudes as those who are religious – that is the case in many Eastern European societies. It is obvious that inside these circumstances the impact of religion will be even smaller than in societies in which these issues are highly contested, irrespectively of the general level of their religiosity. We can conclude that the link between religion and morality largely depends on overall social circumstances that effect general acceptance or rejection of a particular norm.

As Stark suggested the importance of God is really more important as a predictor for acceptance/rejection for some norms than the Church attendance. But that should not be a base for any far-reaching conclusion. Although different, these two measures of religiosity are highly connected. The Church attendance (particularly in societies that still retain relatively high Church attendance) can have many social functions. Ireland, Poland, or Croatia, even Italy, are good examples. However, the problem still remains: what is the link between moral and social community? Some cultural norms, very important for society, are emancipated from religion. Religion still have a big impact, but on norms which are highly contested.

Particularities about Eastern Europe are confirmed also in this analysis. Religion plays a minor role with concerning different moral norms in comparison to Western European countries. Is that a base for conclusion about social irrelevance of religion? At least three reasons suggest different answer. First and because of great differences among countries it is impossible to speak generally about Eastern Europe. There are different lines which divide former Soviet bloc of countries, not only Catholic-Orthodox division. Three additional factors are important: different experiences of prosecution of religion, differences in religious monopoly and differences in how religion act as a possible factor in social/national/language unity of each society. Therefore, in some countries correlation are really low, but in some other they resemble to those found in Western Europe. That does not want to suggest that communist prosecution of religion does not have an effect, but want to analyze possible consequences in the context of other important social factors. Second, general acceptance or rejection of one norm is important factor in analysis. If, for example, in Hungary the mean value of acceptance of homosexuality is only 1.44 is it reasonable to expect any important influence of religion in this case? Third, post-communist social circumstances must be taken into account. Social anomy and moral disorder are evident phenomenon, even if they are not in every case revealed inside the question of a general attitude toward one moral norm. That kind of anomy can have serious effect also on the role of religion in a society.

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
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
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Graph 1


Mean value of justification of the statement “claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to” on the ten-point scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always) in 14 Western European countries



to” on the ten-point scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always) in 13 Eastern European countries



Graph 3
Mean value of justification of the statement “homosexuality” on the ten-point scale from 1



(never) to 10 (always) in 14 Western European countries

Graph 4
Mean value of justification of the statement “homosexuality” on the ten-point scale from 1
(never) to 10 (always) in 13 Eastern European countries




Table 2
Pearson Correlations - Church attendance

- 1 – Claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to
- 2 – Cheating on tax if you have a chance
- 3 – Taking the drug marijuana or hashish
- 4 – Married men/women having an affair
- 5 – Homosexuality
- 5 - Abortion

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Western Europe						

France	-.127**	-.123**	-.161**	-.197**	-.217**	-.262**
G. Britain	-.072*	-.072*	-.099**	-.117**	-.103**	-.166**
Germany	-.076**	-.080**	-.120**	-.181**	-.163**	-.365**
<i>Austria</i>	-.078**	-.148**	-.206**	-.223**	-.250**	-.389**
<i>Italy</i>	-.060**	-.082**	-.386**	-.290**	-.263**	-.407**
<i>Spain</i>	-.077**	-.157**	-.290**	-.288**	-.346**	-.445**
<i>Portugal</i>	-.001	-.021	-.048	-.106**	-.067*	-.208**
Netherlands	-.061	-.180**	-.317**	-.233**	-.245**	-.357**
Belgium	-.081**	-.126**	-.162**	-.205**	-.172**	-.324**
Denmark	-.001	-.153**	-.182**	-.032	-.149**	-.197**
Sweden	-.014	-.090**	-.078*	-.114**	-.154**	-.230**
Finland	-.202**	-.284**	-.210**	-.243**	-.168**	-.346**
N. Ireland	-.149**	-.221**	-.266**	-.154**	-.176**	-.386**
Ireland	-.183**	-.140**	-.339**	-.228**	-.314**	-.340**
Eastern Europe						
Estonia	-.046	-.106**	-.077*	-.083*	-.067*	-.169**
Latvia	-.030	-.068*	-.066*	-.054	-.126**	-.134**
<i>Lithuania</i>	-.085**	-.149**	-.145**	-.235**	-.170**	-.367**
<i>Poland</i>	.068*	-.096**	-.237**	-.158**	-.254**	-.374**
Czech R.	-.056*	-.054*	-.036	-.119**	-.151**	-.301**
Slovakia	-.049	-.113**	-.177**	-.304**	-.278**	-.461**
Hungary	-.108**	-.163**	-.070*	-.198**	-.036	-.174**
Rumania	.039	-.007	-.019	-.117**	-.077*	-.183**
Bulgaria	.021	-.033	.057	.045	.112**	-.040
<i>Croatia</i>	.015	-.061	-.110**	-.177**	-.160**	-.329**
Russia	-.026	-.026	-.019	-.029	-.044*	-.149**
Slovenia	.064*	-.037	-.165**	-.208**	-.188**	-.342**
Ukraine	.011	-.036	-.061*	-.149**	-.033	-.189**

** Significant above 0.01

* Significant above 0.05

Catholic countries (with above 70% of Catholics) marked in italic

Table 3
Pearson Correlations – Importance of God

- 1 – Claiming state benefit which you are not entitled to
- 2 – Cheating on tax if you have a chance
- 3 – Taking the drug marijuana or hashish
- 4 – Married men/women having an affair
- 5 – Homosexuality
- 5 - Abortion

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Western Europe						
France	-.062*	-.143**	-.181**	-.143**	-.162**	-.271**
G. Britain	-.164**	-.135**	-.192**	-.156**	-.153**	-.292**
Germany	-.061*	-.099**	-.094**	-.181**	-.178**	-.387**
<i>Austria</i>	-.100**	-.158**	-.223**	-.273**	-.261**	-.388**
<i>Italy</i>	-.112**	-.108**	-.319**	-.273**	-.201**	-.362**
<i>Spain</i>	-.153**	-.244**	-.330**	-.373**	-.287**	-.423**
<i>Portugal</i>	-.180**	-.152**	-.280**	-.233**	-.221**	-.181**
Netherlands	.037	-.141**	-.295**	-.217**	-.260**	-.407**
Belgium	-.024	-.125**	-.188**	-.193**	-.239**	-.338**
Denmark	.001	-.117**	-.188**	-.055	-.266**	-.304**
Sweden	-.028	-.098*	-.097*	-.071*	-.148**	-.293**
Finland	-.116**	-.256**	-.242**	-.234**	-.169**	-.322**

N. Ireland	-.146**	-.218**	-.326**	-.238**	-.201**	-.387**
Ireland	-.163**	-.151**	-.370**	-.274**	-.305**	-.389**
Eastern Europe						
Estonia	-.015	-.093*	-.083*	-.111*	-.090*	-.161**
Latvia	-.053	-.091*	-.075*	-.056	-.086*	-.148**
<i>Lithuania</i>	-.053	-.144**	-.113*	-.246**	-.146**	-.348**
<i>Poland</i>	.081*	-.107**	-.180**	-.191**	-.276**	-.435**
Czech R.	-.074*	-.142**	-.050*	-.150**	-.107**	-.250**
Slovakia	-.070*	-.149**	-.219**	-.301**	-.239**	-.429**
Hungary	-.118**	-.172**	-.119**	-.219**	-.094**	-.220**
Romania	.018	-.003	-.117**	-.190**	-.178**	-.191**
Bulgaria	-.023	-.109*	-.036	-.175**	-.062	-.160**
<i>Croatia</i>	-.068*	-.163**	-.209**	-.188**	-.222**	-.397**
Russia	-.037	-.035	-.030	-.076**	-.047*	-.137**
Slovenia	.064*	-.037	-.165**	-.208**	-.188**	-.342**
Ukraine	-.062*	-.087*	-.112**	-.126**	-.053	-.188**

** Significant above 0.01

* Significant above 0.05

Catholic countries (with above 70% of Catholics) marked in italic

Table 4 – Regression analysis for moral statements 1 and 2

1=Church attendance; 2= Importance of God

1-Claiming...	Beta	Corr.	R ²	2-Cheating...	Beta	Corr.	R ²
Western Europe				Western Europe			
France- 1	-.125	-.125	.016	France- 1	-	-	.020
France – 2	-	-		France – 2	-.141	-.141	
Great Britain - 1	-	-	.026	Great Britain - 1	-	-	.017
Great Britain – 2	-.161	-.161		Great Britain – 2	-.132	-.132	
Germany – 1	-.078	-.078	.006	Germany – 1	-	-	.010
Germany – 2	-	-		Germany – 2	-.098	-.098	
Austria – 1	-	-	.010	Austria – 1	-.093	-.153	.031
Austria – 2	-.100	-.100		Austria – 2	-.106	-.158	
Italy – 1	-	-	.012	Italy – 1	-	-	.011
Italy – 2	-.109	-.109		Italy – 2	-.105	-.105	
Spain – 1	-	-	.022	Spain – 1	-	-	.060
Spain – 2	-.148	-.148		Spain – 2	-.245	-.245	
Portugal – 1	.090	.003	.039	Portugal – 1	-	-	.023
Portugal – 2	-.216	-.180		Portugal – 2	-.151	-.151	
Netherlands – 1	-	-		Netherlands – 1	-.180	-.180	.032
Netherlands – 2	-	-		Netherlands – 2	-	-	
Belgium – 1	-.077	-.077	.006	Belgium – 1	-.080	-.127	.020
Belgium – 2				Belgium – 2	-.078	-.126	
Denmark – 1	-	-		Denmark – 1	-.155	-.155	.024
Denmark 2	-	-		Denmark 2	-	-	
Sweden – 1	-	-		Sweden – 1	-	-	.010
Sweden – 2	-	-		Sweden – 2	-.098	-.098	
Finland – 1	-.204	-.204	.041	Finland – 1	-.205	-.282	.096
Finland – 2				Finland – 2	-.151	-.256	
N. Ireland – 1	-.089	-.150	.027	N. Ireland – 1	-.133	-.224	.059
N. Ireland – 2	-.089	-.150		N. Ireland – 2	-.123	-.223	
Ireland – 1	-.138	-.184	.041	Ireland – 1	-.083	-.136	.028
Ireland -2	-.098	-.163		Ireland -2	-.112	-.152	
Eastern Europe				Eastern Europe			
Estonia – 1	-	-		Estonia – 1	-.109	-.109	.012

Estonia – 2	-	-		Estonia – 2	-	-	
Latvia – 1	-	-	.005	Latvia – 1	-	-	.008
Latvia – 2	-.069	-.069		Latvia – 2	-.092	-.092	
Lithuania – 1	-.078	-.078	.006	Lithuania – 1	-.163	-.163	.027
Lithuania – 2	-	-		Lithuania – 2	-	-	
Poland – 1	-	-	.007	Poland – 1	-	-	.012
Poland – 2	.081	.081		Poland – 2	-.107	-.107	
Czech R. – 1	-	-	.006	Czech R. – 1	-	-	.020
Czech R. – 2	-.075	-.075		Czech R. – 2	-.141	-.141	
Slovakia – 1	-	-	.005	Slovakia – 1	-	-	.023
Slovakia – 2	-.069	-.069		Slovakia – 2	-.151	-.151	
Hungary – 1	-	-	.014	Hungary – 1	-.103	-.165	.037
Hungary – 2	-.118	-.118		Hungary – 2	-.118	-.172	
Romania – 1	-	-		Romania – 1	-	-	-
Romania – 2	-	-		Romania – 2	-	-	
Bulgaria – 1	-	-		Bulgaria – 1	-	-	.012
Bulgaria – 2	-	-		Bulgaria – 2	-.109	-.109	
Croatia – 1	.077	.021	.009	Croatia – 1	-	-	.027
Croatia – 2	-.108	-.068		Croatia – 2	-.165	-.165	
Russia – 1	-	-		Russia – 1	-	-	-
Russia – 2	-	-		Russia – 2	-	-	
Slovenia – 1	-	-		Slovenia – 1	-	-	-
Slovenia – 2	-	-		Slovenia – 2	-	-	
Ukraine – 1	-	-	.004	Ukraine – 1	-	-	.007
Ukraine – 2	-.061	-.061		Ukraine – 2	-.085	-.085	

Table 5 – Regression analysis for moral statements 3 and 4

1=Church attendance; 2= Importance of God

3-Taking the drug..	Beta	Corr.	R²	4-Married...	Beta	Corr.	R²
Western Europe				Western Europe			
France- 1	-.085	-.162	.037	France- 1	-.196	-.196	.038
France – 2	-.129	-.180		France – 2	-	-	
Great Britain - 1	-	-	.036	Great Britain - 1	-	-	.024
Great Britain – 2	-.191	-.191		Great Britain – 2	-.155	-.155	
Germany – 1	-.124	-.124	.015	Germany – 1	-.102	-.179	.038
Germany – 2	-	-		Germany – 2	-.109	-.181	
Austria – 1	-.124	-.210	.060	Austria – 1	-.105	-.225	.082
Austria – 2	-.153	-.223		Austria – 2	-.214	-.273	
Italy – 1	-.262	-.358	.150	Italy – 1	-.190	-.282	.099
Italy – 2	-.175	-.319		Italy – 2	-.169	-.273	
Spain – 1	-.127	-.284	.118	Spain – 1	-.084	-.284	.144
Spain – 2	-.250	-.330		Spain – 2	-.321	-.373	
Portugal – 1	.074	-.048	.083	Portugal – 1	-	-	.054
Portugal – 2	-.309	-.280		Portugal – 2	-.233	-.233	
Netherlands – 1	-.216	-.317	.115	Netherlands – 1	-.161	-.234	.063
Netherlands – 2	-.158	-.296		Netherlands – 2	-.116	-.217	
Belgium – 1	-.077	-.162	.039	Belgium – 1	-.138	-.205	.050
Belgium – 2	-.143	-.189		Belgium – 2	-.112	-.194	
Denmark – 1	-.117	-.181	.046	Denmark – 1		-	
Denmark 2	-.132	-.189		Denmark 2	-	-	
Sweden – 1	-	-	.009	Sweden – 1	-.117	-.117	.014
Sweden – 2	-.096	-.096		Sweden – 2	-	-	
Finland – 1	-.112	-.207	.068	Finland – 1	-.164	-.241	.074
Finland – 2	-.184	-.242		Finland – 2	-.149	-.233	
N. Ireland – 1	-	-	.110	N. Ireland – 1	-	-	.055
N. Ireland – 2	-.332	-.332		N. Ireland – 2	-.235	-.235	
Ireland – 1	-.206	-.335	.171	Ireland – 1	-.130	-.230	.088

Ireland -2	-.275	-.371		Ireland -2	-.213	-.274	
Eastern Europe				Eastern Europe			
Estonia – 1	-.082	-.082	.007	Estonia – 1	-	-	.013
Estonia – 2	-	-		Estonia – 2	-.116	-.116	
Latvia – 1	-	-	.005	Latvia – 1	-	-	
Latvia – 2	-.073	-.073		Latvia – 2	-	-	
Lithuania – 1	-.153	-.153	.023	Lithuania – 1	-.165	-.251	.074
Lithuania – 2	-	-		Lithuania – 2	-.135	-.240	
Poland – 1	-.202	-.241	.062	Poland – 1	-.077	-.154	.041
Poland – 2	-.078	-.179		Poland – 2	-.153	-.191	
Czech R. – 1	-	-	.002	Czech R. – 1	-	-	.024
Czech R. – 2	-.050	-.050		Czech R. – 2	-.154	-.154	
Slovakia – 1	-	-	.048	Slovakia – 1	-.196	-.312	.108
Slovakia – 2	-.219	-.219		Slovakia – 2	-.153	-.302	
Hungary – 1	-	-	.014	Hungary – 1	-.114	-.197	.057
Hungary – 2	-.119	-.119		Hungary – 2	-.159	-.219	
Romania – 1	-	-	.013	Romania – 1	-.077	-.119	.041
Rumania – 2	-.114	-.114		Rumania – 2	-.170	-.189	
Bulgaria – 1	-	-		Bulgaria – 1	.144	.032	.047
Bulgaria – 2	-	-		Bulgaria - 2	-.242	-.176	
Croatia – 1	-	-	.044	Croatia – 1	-.102	-.172	.044
Croatia – 2	-.209	-.209		Croatia – 2	-.138	-.190	
Russia – 1	-	-		Russia – 1	-	-	.005
Russia – 2	-	-		Russia – 2	-.073	-.073	
Slovenia – 1	-.098	-.172	.038	Slovenia – 1	-.151	-.206	.047
Slovenia – 2	-.118	-.179		Slovenia – 2	-.088	-.182	
Ukraine – 1	-	-	.012	Ukraine – 1	-.147	-.147	.022
Ukraine – 2	-.110	-.110		Ukraine - 2	-	-	

Table 6 - Regression analysis for moral statements 5 and 6

1=Church attendance; 2= Importance of God

Homosexuality	Beta	Corr.	R²	Abortion	Beta	Corr.	R²
Western Europe				Western Europe			
France- 1	-.216	-.216	.047	France- 1	-.154	-.261	.089
France – 2	-	-		France – 2	-.181	-.272	
Great Britain - 1	-	-	.025	Great Britain - 1	-	-	.086
Great Britain – 2	-.157	-.157		Great Britain – 2	-.293	-.293	
Germany – 1	-.086	-.169	.036	Germany – 1	-.177	-.361	.165
Germany – 2	-.118	-.178		Germany – 2	-.263	-.387	
Austria – 1	-.149	-.249	.084	Austria – 1	-.254	-.392	.196
Austria – 2	-.178	-.262		Austria – 2	-.248	-.390	
Italy – 1	-.213	-.260	.072	Italy – 1	-.298	-.408	.193
Italy – 2	-.085	-.202		Italy – 2	-.197	-.363	
Spain – 1	-.285	-.354	.133	Spain – 1	-.301	-.448	.234
Spain – 2	-.111	-.289		Spain – 2	-.233	-.423	
Portugal – 1	-	-	.049	Portugal – 1	-.169	-.214	.056
Portugal – 2	-.221	-.221		Portugal – 2	-.112	-.180	
Netherlands – 1	-.134	-.245	.078	Netherlands – 1	-.164	-.357	.182
Netherlands – 2	-.175	-.260		Netherlands – 2	-.302	-.407	
Belgium – 1	-	-	.057	Belgium – 1	-.194	-.326	.139
Belgium – 2	-.238	-.238		Belgium – 2	-.224	-.338	
Denmark – 1	-	-	.050	Denmark – 1	-	-	.093
Denmark 2	-.224	-.224		Denmark 2	-.305	-.305	
Sweden – 1	-.108	-.155	.031	Sweden – 1	-.112	-.230	.095
Sweden – 2	-.094	-.148		Sweden – 2	-.237	-.292	
Finland – 1	-.099	-.160	.035	Finland – 1	-.251	-.351	.150
Finland – 2	-.116	-.168		Finland – 2	-.191	-.322	
N. Ireland – 1	-	-	.041	N. Ireland – 1	-.219	-.384	.178

N. Ireland – 2	-.204	-.204		N. Ireland – 2	-.240	-.390	
Ireland – 1	-.220	-.314	.131	Ireland – 1	-.195	-.337	.180
Ireland -2	-.204	-.305		Ireland -2	-.295	-.389	
Eastern Europe				Eastern Europe			
Estonia – 1	-	-	.008	Estonia – 1	-.115	-.169	.035
Estonia – 2	-.092	-.092		Estonia – 2	-.103	-.159	
Latvia – 1	-.125	-.125	.016	Latvia – 1	-	-	.023
Latvia – 2	-	-		Latvia – 2	-.150	-.150	
Lithuania – 1	-.113	-.171	.034	Lithuania – 1	-.289	-.394	.172
Lithuania – 2	-.090	-.163		Lithuania – 2	-.166	-.348	
Poland – 1	-.157	-.254	.095	Poland – 1	-.219	-.380	.224
Poland – 2	-.199	-.276		Poland – 2	-.326	-.434	
Czech R. – 1	-.148	-.148	.022	Czech R. – 1	-.248	-.308	.101
Czech R. – 2	-	-		Czech R. – 2	-.097	-.251	
Slovakia – 1	-.283	-.283	.080	Slovakia – 1	-.300	-.453	.224
Slovakia – 2	-	-		Slovakia – 2	-.205	-.429	
Hungary – 1	-	-	.009	Hungary – 1	-.088	-.179	.054
Hungary – 2	-.093	-.093		Hungary – 2	-.173	-.219	
Romania – 1	-	-	.029	Romania – 1	-.136	-.179	.055
Rumania – 2	-.170	-.170		Rumania – 2	-.158	-.195	
Bulgaria – 1	.175	.106	.028	Bulgaria – 1	-	-	.026
Bulgaria – 2	-.145	-.063		Bulgaria - 2	-.162	-.162	
Croatia – 1	-.083	-.175	.055	Croatia – 1	-.181	-.338	.184
Croatia – 2	-.181	-.223		Croatia – 2	-.308	-.400	
Russia – 1	-.045	-.045	.002	Russia – 1	-.104	-.147	.027
Russia – 2	-	-		Russia – 2	-.084	-.137	
Slovenia – 1	-.096	-.188	.049	Slovenia – 1	-.210	-.346	.149
Slovenia – 2	-.149	-.208		Slovenia – 2	-.220	-.350	
Ukraine – 1	-	-	-	Ukraine – 1	-.130	-.193	.046
Ukraine - 2	-	-		Ukraine - 2	-.113	-.186	