Because, as Jim Fowler so rightly points out, paideia is central to
the life of a people, and especially to the life of a free people, reflection
about paideia, that is, education in the deepest and fullest sense of the
word, involves reflection about the kind of society we are, a reflection both
wide and deep-and in some ways that is more than a little frightening.
I will be responding to Jim's paper, "Pluralism, Particularity and Paideia,"
which, as he says, is p to the q and which reminds me that a friend of mine is
writing a book on ancient Greece and Israel that he plans to call Polis,
Piety, Power, and Paranoia, p to the fourth power. Jim's paper, explicitly
and implicitly, informs what I will be saying throughout these remarks.
But there are some other things that I have been reading of late which
obtrude themselves by way of preliminary comment and keep me from beginning
where I would by instinct begin, namely, with the place of public education in
the American founding, although stay with me, I will get to that.
A little book that has had a large impact on me recently is George Grant's English
Speaking Justice [1974], published by Notre Dame University Press in the
Revision Series edited by Alasdair McIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas. George Grant
is a distinguished Canadian political philosopher who is deeply conservative and
deeply religious and so has some unexpectedly rough things to say about us
Americans. He points out that for all our freedom and decency, which he admires
and would protect, we are an empire and have been growing steadily more imperial
throughout the 20th century, and especially since World War II. And
the principle of empire is not freedom or decency but power. I don't think
Grant means to say that our power is necessarily evil but rather that power and
the maintenance of power when they become ends in themselves-as always happens
in an empire-can indeed become evil. And certainly, it is well to remember
that power was not the principle of that small agrarian republic established on
the remote peripheries of the civilized world more than 200 years ago. So, we
live in the American republic but it is an imperial republic.
What is education like in an imperial republic whose principle is, in part at
least, power? Alas, one does not have to go far for the answer. One does not
have to go to the primary and secondary schools. One only has to look at our
universities, or perhaps I should say I only have to look at my university, the
University of California at Berkeley, Clark Kerr's original multiversity. And
I can indeed testify that there is plenty of multi- and not very much uni-
in that institution. Instrumental rationality, knowledge for the sake of power,
with its attendant presuppositions of positivism, relativism, reductionism and
determinism-that is the ethos of the research university. And the better the
university the more total is the control of that ethos.
So, if we want to understand the crisis in our public schools a look at the
modern research university might indeed be in order. What else could we expect
if the very citadel of the intellectual life is so problematic? Wilfred Cantwell
Smith, another Canadian, has pointed out that the ethos of instrumental
rationality undermines the traditional understanding of the university
altogether. Indeed, it turns it into something else so that Clark Kerr needs a
new word. "If," Wilfred writes,
truth is not transcendentally good, if values are merely whatever is
valued rather than what is in fact valuable, if the amoral impersonalism of
objective science is our knowledge, if the rational is the instrumental, if
being human has no intrinsic, or absolute, or higher, or even shared
purpose, only individual purposes, then there is no reason why the
university should continue to have loyalty and consensus within, respect
without, and freedom from tight state control. Efficiency management for
externally imposed objectives would be its rational role.
What is true of the university in an imperial republic would follow naturally
for education generally. Indeed, I think if one inspects the literature about
the crisis in public education, many writing on that subject are concerned
precisely with the fact that there is a lack of efficiency management for
external objectives. The context of crisis and concern is international
competition: if we don't have enough technicians, if our math is too weak, we
won't continue to maintain our power in the world. I think the group meeting
this week has some other problems that we feel are at the heart of this crisis.
But we should not kid ourselves. Much of the concern with public education is
precisely in the context of knowledge for power.
My final footnote to recent reading before I really get underway is a bit
more personal and yet so relevant to my own thinking that I think I should tell
you about it. Earlier this spring, I began to read the Old Testament
straight through beginning with Genesis for the first time in a very long
time. And last night I just finished Second Kings-the end of that great
historic arc of the story of ancient Israel-and it is a sobering story. In
many, many ways, it is a sobering story. But one of the things it is sobering
about is empire. There is, of course, Egypt and Assyria and Babylon. But what
happened to Israel? Samuel warned the Israelites about kingship. He depicted a
situation of power in which the people would be used as tools in the hands of
the monarchy with a vividness that must have recalled the Egyptian captivity.
But the people would not listen. They wanted a king. So, Israel became Egypt.
Israel became Babylon. And to David, and Solomon, and Jeroboam, and Manasseh,
and the long, sad litany of kings of Israel and Judah, there came in the end the
reversal that would lead to a new captivity.
Michael Walzer, in his recent slender commentary, Exodus and
Revolution [1985], reminds us of a simple correlative of the Exodus
story that is true for human beings most of the time. "Wherever you
are," says Michael Walzer, "it is probably Egypt." In the 17th
and 18th centuries, America was Israel, or thought it was, and viewed
crossing the Atlantic as an Exodus crossing of the Red Sea, or as escaping from
the Babylon of Europe. John Winthrop is the Nehemiah Americanus, in
Cotton Matther's phrase. But today, what are we? Are we not Egypt locked in a
titanic power struggle with Assyria? What of the many small nations in between?
And what about modern Israel, in less than 40 years from exodus to empire?
Those are sobering thoughts and we must not forget them, especially we
Americans must not forget them. We must not forget, as George Grant insists we
must not forget, that we live in an empire. Yet, that is not the whole story. If
we are an imperial republic then there is still an inner conflict. There is
still a struggle worth the waging. And so again, in recent weeks, one is
surprised to discover in the very heart of the great universities a deep concern
about investment in South Africa and a movement to divest the university of
those investments-on the whole responsibly, over a period of years, with
conditions-but nonetheless a moral act that one has almost forgotten could
come from faculties, not just from students. A flicker of conscience in the
desert, you may say, but I think not a negligible one. So let us try to think
the republican side of our institutions to see how we might revive them today.
Education has always been a central concern of free societies. For the
flourishing and even survival of a free society depends on the quality of its
citizens-and citizens
are formed through education. Here, education does not mean only what occurs
in schools, for education also takes place in the family, in church, in the
process of political participation itself. Alas, also in the living room in
front of the television screen all too often. There are many voices clamoring
for the paideia of Americans today besides the schools. But in America,
the school has from early in the history of our republic played a particularly
important part in that education for civic participation.
Of the founders of the republic, Jefferson had the keenest interest in
education and saw it as critically important for a free society. More I think
than any of the others, he worked steadily over many years for a comprehensive
system of public, tax-supported education, including grammar schools, which
would be open to all. Among the purposes of primary education Jefferson
suggested, and he made a list, we have his own words, besides what he spoke of
as the knowledge and skills to pursue the student's own interests, he added
these further purposes:
· To understand his duties to his neighbors and his country and to
discharge with competence the functions confided to him by either.
· To know his rights.
· To exercise with order and justice those he retains.
· To choose with discretion the fiduciary of those he delegates.
· And to notice their conduct with diligence, with candor and with
judgment.
Those are the tasks of citizens which education should prepare us for.
And to this end, the student, in the primary years, was to be taught reading,
writing, arithmetic, mensuration, geography, and history. Note that Jefferson
saw education as helping to form citizens capable of discharging their duties to
neighbors and country, knowing and discharging their rights, and choosing and
reviewing their delegates to government bodies. In the latter regard, Jefferson
shared Madison's view that only virtuous and wise citizens would choose
virtuous and wise rulers. Without a modicum of decency in the populace at large,
we could not expect a free society to survive. As John Adams put it, our
constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly
unsuited to any other.
Jefferson, Madison, Adams, all of them assumed-whatever their own private
beliefs, and that is a long story-the presence of religion in the
citizen-body, even in the school. Jefferson, of course, saw the presence of
religion in the school in a generalized, nonsectarian form closely linked to
moral obligation in a way, as Jim Fowler's paper points out, quite parallel to
the work of Horace Mann in New England. There are problems with that, but, as
usual, the notion of the wall of separation never kept Jefferson from imagining
that religion could be dispensed with in our public life.
In many colonies education was for the wealthy, although of course only for
whites and only for males. In the early republic, there was an effort to extend
it to all white males and that of course was the limit of Jefferson's own
concern.
But the case for the education of women was also being made in the early
decades of the 19th century. Long after they were a part of the
grammar schools, there was still a struggle to establish women's academies,
women's colleges. And, of course, the movement for higher education for women
was closely related to the movement for women's suffrage, for the
consciousness of women's rights. All those things go together. If we consider
developments in the field of black education, we would see parallels. In short,
what begins in limited form tends to spread in American history and those left
out demand to be let in and education is always a key point in that entry.
But in this development, which of course would take a great deal of time to
describe in detail, there was an ambiguity from the beginning, inherent even in
Jefferson's ideas about popular education. Education was to provide the
knowledge and skills for personal advancement and education was to provide the
knowledge and skills for citizenship. What should go together-what was assumed
in those days would necessarily go together-can of course come apart. In
America, the danger has been that education for private advancement would crowd
out education for citizenship, or distort the idea of citizenship into only one
more tool of private advantage. Again, this danger is particularly great at
present when the stress on education is overwhelmingly its contribution to the
economy in the context of a highly competitive and dangerous world and the
emphasis is on the dissemination of technical skills. This view sees our
population more as producers than as citizens and links private advantage with
imperial power without regard for citizenship and free institutions.
The danger of this trend is that it can lead to a trade off between private
advancement and public authoritarianism. This can occur even when the forms of
democratic rule are maintained, as Tocqueville saw 150 years ago when he
described what he called a democratic despotism in which the citizens would
periodically, as he put it, quit their state of dependence just long enough to
choose their masters and then fall back into it. The forms of election, to
Tocqueville, did not mean the substance of free institutions. Max Weber, much
more ominously because much closer to us, writing in the early 20th
century, described also a situation in which elections remain important, and
called that system leader-democracy, or in German, Führer-democracy, to
which he gave the only seemingly paradoxical formula of "as much freedom as
possible through as much domination as possible." Private freedom in
exchange for public domination. It is the late 20th century scenario
for democratic despotism. In this pattern of Führer-democracy, the
citizens choose a leader because of his personal charisma and not because of any
conviction about the value of the aims he pursues. Of course the leader must be
successful in the immediate payoff terms of economic prosperity and political
power but if he is successful, the citizens-although I think we have to ask
whether the populace at this point deserves the term citizens-but anyway, if
he is successful, the citizens ask no questions. Such leaders are not chosen, as
Jefferson would have it, with discretion, and their conduct is not noticed with
diligence, candor and judgment. Indeed, we have the prescription for leadership
in an imperial republic.
But if this is the trend-and who can look at our political scene today and
not see it-how can the schools recover their task as educators not only for
private advancement and imperial power but also for responsible citizenship?
This is an enormous subject. It would require us to meditate on the ethos of
public education and the practices that prevail in the public schools today with
much more knowledge than I can bring to bear. So in the face of these difficult
problems I have only some very modest and simple suggestions that really focus
on the key element in any educational system, namely, the teacher.
I think Jim Fowler's discussion of faith as a basis, perhaps the basis, for
education is compelling. And it deserves to be worked out in all its pedagogical
implications. I would indeed love to convince my instrumental rationalist
colleagues of the primacy of faith and I do believe that even for them faith-a
kind of faith-is primary. But that is a very hard job, which I certainly am
not going to try today. Rather I want to speak about education for character and
citizenship in a much more conventional context through the teaching that goes
on in schools and through the teaching in two of the areas that Jefferson
singled out as absolutely essential: reading and history. Reading is a profound
question, however simple it may seem, because it isn't just a question of
sounding out the syllables: it's a question of what is read. My emphasis on
reading and history rests on the presupposition that moral and spiritual
education is best carried out, certainly best initially carried out, through the
presentation of narratives and exemplars. It is here that those things enter
into the curriculum of primary and secondary education.
But simultaneously, as I point to these areas of teaching, I must also point
to the teacher. If we are thinking about education for character or citizenship,
for spiritual sensitivity, we must presume teachers for whom those things are
real. How could they teach what they do not know, experience and live
themselves? The old quis custodiet ipsos custodes? [Who shall guard the
guardians themselves?] The teachers are the guardians of the tradition. Who will
help us if they have lost it?
I want to quote from Helen Vendler's wonderful Modern Language Association
"Presidential Address" of 1980 [PMLA 96 (1981), pp. 344-50],
which I did in the last chapter of Habits of the Heart [1996 {1985}]. But
on this occasion, I would like to do so somewhat more copiously because she so
clearly makes the point I want to make. She is talking to teachers, even if they
are primarily freshman English teachers. What that means for earlier education I
think will be clear in a moment. She takes as her text-and she in a sense
preaches from this text-some lines of William Wordsworth that come at the end
of The Prelude where Wordsworth writes:
What we have loved, Others will love, and we will teach them how. But, again, if we as teachers
haven't loved the right things how can we ever teach them to others?
Vendler speaks of teaching literature as, in the first instance, teaching
reading. Literature is something written. Literature, and the teaching of it and
the teaching of reading, involves, she says, "problems raised by human
submission to, and interrogation of, a text." For all the television and
the computers and all the rest of it I don't think the human species is soon
going to forget the importance of the text. And when we face what Vendler calls
the "problems raised by human submission to, and interrogation of, a
text," we are already in the middle of moral education. What does it mean
to listen to a text, to try to hear what it is saying? That is not simply a
cognitive issue. There is a moral relationship involved. How, in turn, do we ask
that text questions? How do we hear the questions it asks us? How do we engage
in a conversation with a text? Almost all of the problems of our moral life are
already there in the simplest act of teaching to read something worth reading.
Vendler then goes on to describe the problem of teaching. She is thinking, as
I said, primarily of freshman English, people who come to college from the
present state of our primary and secondary education. "Our students come to
us," she says,
from secondary school having read no works of literature in foreign
languages and scarcely any works of literature in their own language. The very
years, between twelve and eighteen, when they might be reading rapidly,
uncritically, rangingly, happily, thoughtlessly, are somehow dissipated
without cumulative force. Those who end their education with secondary school
have been cheated altogether of their literary inheritance from the Bible to
Robert Lowell. It is no wonder that they do not love what we love; we as a
culture have not taught them to. With a reformed curriculum beginning in
preschool, all children would know about the Prodigal Son and the Minotaur;
they would know the stories presumed by our literature, as children reading
Lamb's Tales from Shakespeare or Hawthorne's Tanglewood
Tales once knew them. We can surely tell them the tales before they can
read Shakespeare or Ovid; there are literary forms appropriate to every age,
even the very youngest.
And here is a passage that links the teaching of literature to precisely the
heart of a moral education. "Nothing is more lonely," Helen Vendler
says,
than to go through life uncompanioned by a sense that others have also gone
through it, and have left a record of their experience. Every adult needs to
be able to think of Job, or Orpheus, or Circe, or Ruth, or Lear, or Jesus, or
the Golden Calf, or the Holy Grail, or Antigone in order to refer private
experience to some identifying frame or solacing reflection.
"I do not mean," she goes on to say,
by emphasizing the great tales of our inherited culture, to minimize the
local and the ethnic. Literary imagination is incurably local. But it is
against the indispensable background of the general literary culture that
native authors assert their local imaginations. Our schools cannot afford to
neglect either resource..
"It is not within our power," she says,
to reform the primary and secondary schools, even if we have a sense of how
that reform might begin. We do have it within our power, I believe, to reform
ourselves, to make it our own first task to give, especially to our beginning
students, that rich web of associations lodged in the tales of majority and
minority culture alike, by which they could begin to understand themselves as
individuals and as social beings. We must give them some examples of
literature, suited to their level of reading, in which these tales have an
indisputably literary embodiment. All freshmen English courses, to my mind,
should devote at least half their time to the reading of myth, legend and
parable. We owe it to ourselves to teach what we love on our first, decisive
encounter with our students and to insist that the freedom to write is based
on a freedom of reading. Otherwise we misrepresent ourselves, and we deprive
our students. Too often, they go away, disheartened about our implicit or
explicit criticism of their speech and writing in English or in a foreign
language; and we go away disheartened by our conviction that we have not in
that first year engaged their hearts or their minds; and both parties never
see each other again. And the public, instead of remembering how often in
later life they have thought of the parable of the talents, or the loss of
Eurydice, or the sacrifice of Isaac, or the patience of Penelope, or the fox
and the grapes or the minister's black veil, remember the humiliations of
freshmen English or long-lost drills in language laboratory. We owe it to
ourselves to show our students, when they first meet us, what we are; we owe
their dormant appetites, thwarted for so long in their previous schooling,
that deep sustenance that will make them realize that they too, having been
taught, love what we love.
That reminds me of a story that Bill Bennett tells of asking particularly
talented high school seniors how many of them know who Jonathan and David are,
and then how many know who Starsky and Hutch are, and the appalling difference
in the percentage. [It is a commentary on the transience of popular culture that
Starsky and Hutch, so popular in 1985, would scarcely be recognized today.]
Now Helen Vendler's paragraphs are instructive in many ways, not least
because they are instructive about religion so unconsciously. Vendler is not
concerned about teaching religion-she never mentions the word religion-and
yet, biblical references recur more than any other in her essay. What she seems
to be saying is: it is not possible to transmit the narrative culture of the
West without the Bible. Perhaps Horace Mann was not entirely wrong in thinking
that the Bible is best taught in school simply as narrative with a minimal of
catechetical or theological explication. But the message is the story and if the
teacher loves the story the message gets through.
Literature connects imperceptibly with history. For many narratives,
including biblical narratives, are located in time and place, are historical.
But it is precisely in the teaching of history, the history of free institutions
generally and of the American republic in particular, that we show the incipient
citizens the tradition of citizenship to which they belong. And to do that well,
of course, we must love that tradition.
Walter Lippmann, in The Public Philosophy [1955], makes the link that
connects Vendler's concerns with the concerns of citizenship. In speaking
about tradition as essential to the public philosophy, Lippmann says,
But traditions are more than the culture of the arts and sciences. They are
the public world to which our private worlds are joined. This continuum of
public and private memories transcends all persons in their immediate and
natural lives and it ties them all together. In it there is performed the
mystery by which individuals are adopted and initiated into membership in the
community. The body, which carries this mystery, is the history of the
community and its central theme is the great deeds and high purposes of the
great predecessors. From them, the new generations descend and prove
themselves by becoming participants in the unfinished story.
That reminds me of an account I heard recently from a professor of American
Studies who was visiting a classroom, an elementary classroom, in Denver. There
was a young Vietnamese child who had only been in this country for four or five
years who proudly pointed out to the visitor that the picture on the wall was
George Washington, the father of our country. That story already belonged to
this child. It is part of becoming a citizen to see ourselves in a tradition of
citizenship and to understand one's predecessors and how they exercised their
rights, established a constitution, and steadily extended those rights to
include more and more of those who had been initially left out. It is a dramatic
and dynamic story. It is only boring if it is deprived of actors, motives and
causes, as was devastatingly pointed out by Frances Fitzgerald a few years ago
in her book on high school history texts, America Revised [1979], where
no human beings ever did anything. Things just happened because of generalized
causes.
There are those who support a kind of pious history in which our nation has
never been anything but noble and generous and our leaders and people have never
done anything wrong. In reaction to this, we have had for quite a while,
reaching a crescendo in the 1960s, but by no means gone, the school of the
unmaskers and the debunkers who argue that our noble leaders were always racists
and oppressors, that our history is a long catalogue of prejudice, exploitation
and disaster. As one student said to me in Berkeley at the height of the
demonstrations in the late 60s: this is the worst society that has ever existed.
That is a testimony to the failure to teach history I am afraid.
History in neither of these versions leads to good citizenship. For in the
first version, the pious-history version, if everything had always been so
wonderful then there is no reason for citizens to enter the public sphere at
all; and in the second version, since things are so bad and evil has so
consistently triumphed, there is also no point in citizen action. It will surely
fail. Both views promote both cynicism and privatism. This is a case where
honest history is also the best history for educating citizens. There have been
real conflicts in our history in which Americans have not always acted well but
neither have they always acted badly. Jefferson, Lincoln, Martin Luther King,
Jr.-all had real flaws. All made mistakes. Yet, they were real heroes who
believed in and fought for noble purposes and with whom we can rightly identify.
Nor, rightly understood, is there a necessary split between majority history
and minority history. Viewed in terms of the struggle for democratic political
participation the issues are the same. I think it is possible to get students of
whatever race or sex to identify with blacks and with whites, with men and with
women in the course of American history. Not that we have done enough of that,
though we have made a beginning. But it is part of one story.
And, of course, one of the things that divides us as well as unites us is
religion. To leave religion out of the story is to empty it of the heart of its
deepest meaning. Religion is an indelible, indeed a foundational, part of the
history of this republic. And if we teach history honestly, we will teach
religion. How can we teach colonial history without talking about the Puritan
errand into the wilderness, without having the students read John Winthrop's
"Model of Christian Charity"? How can we teach the Declaration of
Independence without considering what meaning the words "the laws of
Nature and Nature's God" might have; without talking about "the
Creator" that the Declaration says has endowed us with "certain
unalienable rights"? How can we teach Lincoln without explaining the deep
piety of the Gettysburg Address or the Second Inaugural Address?
And must we not also tell the story of the prejudice against Irish Catholic
immigrants, about the violence that was done against them? And what of the
Mormons and their persecution and their long trek to the West? Must we not tell
the story of black religion and of the great Biblical archetypes of exodus and
liberation that inspired black leaders such as Martin Luther King? This is part
of the story. To leave it out is to empty the story of an utterly central
dimension of its truth, of its being, of that which makes us citizens. It is not
to say that we are all the same. It is not to say that there aren't different
denominations and traditions. Indeed, there are those who are not Christians,
who are not Jews, and we might remember them too. But it is all part of the
story if we tell it right. It is the narrative-more than any preaching about
the narrative; what happened and who the people were who made it happen-that
has the deepest impact on character, on citizenship, by giving the models and
the examples which show the young people what it might mean to be a good person
and a good citizen.
We shouldn't kid ourselves that those stories are always going to be
uplifting. Nobody who has ever tried to teach the Bible honestly will say that
every story is uplifting. There are tragic stories. There are deeply troubling
stories. This is no simple-minded optimistic, pious version of what should
happen. But if the stories are allowed to speak, with all the sharpness that is
in them, the education will follow.
And, of course, we come back again to the problem of who is doing the
teaching. The teacher must understand and believe in what he or she is teaching.
For only if the teacher knows what it is to be a citizen can that be
communicated to students. Here, I think, teachers themselves are intimidated by
the dominant ethos of instrumental rationality into thinking that they must
maintain some kind of scientific neutrality in areas where scientific neutrality
destroys the meaning of what is being taught. For the student will know at once
if the teacher has no convictions and is simply transmitting something by rote.
The teacher must have convictions to teach any of the things we have been
talking about, and must have the courage of those convictions, which does not
mean that the teacher must not also be open to the challenge from the student,
open to discuss any of those convictions. But that does not mean the absence of
convictions.
And since religion is an indelible aspect of the convictions of at least many
of us, that too has to be part of the honest story. This is true in any
humanistic field. It is true in the university as well as in the primary and
secondary schools. It is a delicate matter, I admit, but the notion of being
some kind of teaching machine will not do the job. Because of the dominance of
the natural science ethos, we tend to think that those convictions, and the
courage of those convictions, are somehow subjective, purely private, purely
personal. For that reason, too, we are not sure we have a right to bring such
things into the teaching process-particularly where the students may not be
very receptive to the convictions of the teacher, particularly if they have what
we call "other values."
But tradition and history-religious and republican-are just as objective
as science; and they have to be treated as a part of the real world, for indeed
they are. They are a part of who we are, of what made us what we are. They are
not something we made up in the interiority of our private consciousness.
Flannery O'Connor, a great Georgia author, has put the point well in speaking
about some of the things that we are talking about when she says, "No one
asks the student if algebra pleases him or if he finds it satisfactory that some
French verbs are irregular." In history, in literature, in the story of our
lives together as citizens, we are there not primarily, at least not in the
first instance, to consult the views of our students but to form them. Of course
we need to start where the students are. Of course, we need to hear what they
think and let them express what they think. But we are not in a situation of
total anarchy where there is no clarity as to what needs to be taught; and it is
an abdication of our responsibility to behave as though that is the case.
Again, Flannery O'Connor, in her wry and humorous remarks about her own
education or lack thereof: "I know no history whatsoever. In high school we
studied at hindsight-foremost beginning with the daily paper and tracing
problems back from there but we never got very far." Again, that method may
at times not be a bad strategy. But to capitulate to our students and their
inveterate presentism is to deprive them of perspective, of a deeper view than
the present, of other realities that might open up the present to them. When a
student writes in a paper on Lincoln that he went to the movies and got shot, we
know we have failed very badly. Of course, part of what we have to teach is the
painful fact that we are citizens of an imperial republic. That is delicate too
but it is part of the story and we need to tell the story.
In short, there are many things schools can do to prepare students for
citizenship, and many dimensions-history, reading, literature, religion-that
are indelibly part of that story, which is basic for their formation as
citizens. And we need, above all, not to be ashamed of the story we have to
tell. It is a great story. It is a story full of conflict. It is not always a
beautiful story. It is a story of success. It is also a story of stunning
failure and moral squalor. It is a story of suffering endured and suffering
inflicted. But if we teach it as it is-neither piously nor cynically-we will
help pull our students away from exclusive concern for private advancement and
we may just help to save our democratic republic from the clutches of imperial
power.